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ABSTRACT 
 The current study takes an initial step toward deriving a method for empirically based, 
theory-driven treatment matching in a military population suffering from PTSD. Along with the 
more overt symptoms of PTSD (e.g., persistent hyperarousal), secondary cognitive symptoms 
have also been shown to be significantly associated with avoidance and intrusive symptoms, as 
well as contribute to functional impairment. Based on the factor analytic and treatment literature 
for PTSD, it appears that there are two central mechanisms associated with beneficial therapeutic 
change that underlies both CPT and PE treatments (i.e., habituation, changes in cognitions). 
Additionally, different traumatic events and peritraumatic responses may be associated with 
unique symptom profiles and may necessitate targeted treatment.  The present study proposes a 
novel approach to treatment matching based on the factor structure of PTSD and underlying 
mechanisms of treatment response. More broadly, this paper provides evidence for a broader 
understanding of peritraumatic responses and the potential implications of these responses for 
symptom profiles and illness trajectories. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Armed-service members are subjected to a wide array of potentially traumatic events 
(Hoge et al., 2004; Litz et al., 2009), and exhibit varying peritraumtic responses (Brewin et al., 
2000) that may be associated with different clinical presentations and symptom profiles. For 
example, traumatic experiences characterized by prolonged/unexpected feelings of helplessness 
(e.g., IED explosion, direct gun fire) may lead to a distinctly different subset of symptoms than 
traumas associated with guilt/shame (e.g., witnessing the death of a fellow soldier, harming a 
child). Researchers have attempted to devise methods to categorize types of traumatic events 
(Litz et al., 2009) and match these events to specific symptoms (Stein et al., 2012). For example, 
Stein and colleagues (2012) found that events related to “moral injury” (i.e., events that were in-
contrast with the individuals self-schema) predicted re-experiencing and guilt symptoms, 
whereas trauma related to the aftermath of violence predicted negative cognitions about the 
world. However, the type of trauma the individual experiences may not be as relevant to 
treatment as the symptom profile the event elicits.  
Based on the PTSD treatment literature, sustained peritraumatic hyperarousal and the 
formation of persistent negative cognitions have been identified as two distinct, but potentially 
co-occurring, maladaptive patterns of responding to a traumatic event. These response patterns 
have been identified as primary sources of functional impairment (Resick & Miller, 2009) and 
potential targets of therapeutic interventions. Despite the clinical utility of conceptualizing PTSD 
in these terms, physiological and cognitive symptom clusters have never previously been subject 
to confirmatory factor analysis. This is likely because traditionally, CFA is used to identify the 
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factors that comprise the construct of PTSD to assist in theorizing about the origins, prevention, 
and treatment of the disorder. However, Marshall and colleagues (Marshall et al., 2013) have 
stated that it is unlikely that one model of PTSD will emerge that best characterizes maladaptive 
responding to traumatic events. Instead, Marshall and colleagues recommended devising models 
that are useful for specific purposes. The present confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) aims to 
devise a method for treatment matching based on the PTSD treatment literature and, specifically, 
existing factor analytic studies regarding PTSD, which have been the subject of considerable 
debate.  
Currently, the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD (see Table 1) are comprised of four main 
symptom categories (i.e., intrusive, avoidance, negative cognitive/mood, and hyperarousal) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although there is support for this factor structure (for 
summary see Friedman et al., 2011), alternative two- (Asmundson et al., 2003), three- (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), four-(Rademaker et al., 2012; Simms, Watson & Doebbelin, 
2002), and five-factor (Elhai et al., 2011) models have been proposed. Of these models, the 
dysphoric and numbing models have received the most attention in the literature, have garnered 
the most empirical support, and were a primary source of recent changes to the DSM-5 PTSD 
criteria. The dysphoric and numbing models identify an internalizing symptom presentation that 
is characterized by symptoms related to a reduction in emotional experience and general 
emotional distress. The numbing model closely resembles the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD (see 
Table 1), with the exception of separating the avoidance symptom cluster into effortful 
avoidance (C1-C2), defined as the willful avoidance of thoughts, people, and places, and 
emotional numbing (C3-C7).  The latter includes amnesia, anhedonia, detachment from others, 
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restricted range of affect, and a sense of foreshortened future. The dysphoria model also includes 
this division of the avoidance factor, but combines the numbing symptoms with three arousal 
symptoms to create a dysphoric factor. The resulting dysphoric factor is based on the clustering 
of these eight symptoms (i.e., D1-D3 and C3-C7) that include the numbing symptoms along with 
difficulty sleeping, irritability, and difficulty concentrating. By combining elements of the 
avoidance and arousal factor, the dysphoria model also creates an additional two-item 
hyperarousal factor comprised of the remaining arousal symptoms (i.e., hypervigilance and an 
exaggerated startle response). The authors of the dysphoria model have argued that the clustering 
of the dysphoric symptoms is associated with a general distress and dysphoria construct common 
to many anxiety and depressive disorders (Simms et al., 2002) whereas the remaining factors are 
more characteristic of an anxious traumatic response.  
In a recent meta-analysis, the dysphoric model was found to provide marginally superior 
fit than the numbing model (Yufic & Sims, 2010). However, other researchers have 
demonstrated that although the dysphoric and numbing models differ conceptually and the 
overall fit of the dysphoric model has been shown to be marginally superior, the mathematical 
difference between these two models hinges on the estimation of the correlation between the 
symptoms in the arousal factor and not on the clustering of the dysphoric symptoms (Elhai et al., 
2011; Marshall et al., 2013). The arousal factor in the dysphoric model contains only two 
symptoms, whereas the arousal factor in the numbing model contains all five symptoms present 
in the DSM-IV arousal criteria. The superiority of the dysphoric model relies on the 
underestimation of this two-item correlation in the numbing model and not on the clustering of 
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the symptoms in the dysphoric factor (Marshall, 2013). Therefore, each of these models equally 
account for the latent PTSD construct, despite their conceptual difference.  
 Based on the dysphoric and numbing models, a five-factor model has also been posited 
(Elhai et al., 2011). This model separates the dysphoric factor into the numbing symptoms (C3-
C7) and three general dysphoric symptoms (D1-D3) common to many anxiety and depressive 
disorders. The five-factor model demonstrated better fit than the dysphoric and numbing models. 
The researchers suggested that this was because the five-factor model better accounts for the 
separation of fear-based symptoms present in the re-experiencing and the two-item arousal 
factors, as well as accounts for the depression-related symptoms represented by the emotional 
numbing factor (Elahi et al., 2011).  
Despite numerous studies investigating the latent and factor structure of PTSD, the 
evidence is still unclear as to whether the cognitive and dysphoric symptoms of PTSD represent 
a unique symptom profile necessitating targeted PTSD treatment or whether these symptoms are 
attributable to comorbid depression (Moore et al., 2009). Due to the conceptual overlap between 
the internalizing symptoms of PTSD and depression, some researchers have suggested the 
removal of these symptoms (Brewin, 2009). However, there is increased recognition of the 
diverse presentation of PTSD (Friedman et al., 2011) and the contribution of dysphoric and 
anhedonic symptoms in predicting the duration, severity, and functional impairment associated 
with PTSD (Friedman et al., 2013; Meiser-Stedman et al., 2009; Moser et al., 2007). 
Additionally, there is substantial evidence for the presence of distinct maladaptive cognitions 
specifically associated with traumatic stress (Friedman et al., 2011; Resick et al., 2009). 
Longitudinal evidence has shown a bi-directional relationship between depression and PTSD, 
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suggesting that depressive symptoms may be a core element of a maladaptive traumatic response 
(Dekel et al., 2014). Based partially on this evidence a “negative alterations in cognitions and 
mood” symptom cluster has been included in the DSM-5 comprised of persistent cognitions and 
numbing symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
One potential method for resolving these issues is to uncover a factor structure of PTSD 
by examining the extensive PTSD treatment literature and underlying mechanism of therapeutic 
action. Limited empirical evidence exists that supports efficacious treatment for combat veterans 
(Frueh et al., 2007). Data from available treatment studies suggests that the effect sizes of 
available psychological treatments are moderate, are associated with high dropout rates, and are 
minimally beneficial or ineffective for a substantial portion of patients (Bradly et al., 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2009). Given the complex role of both heightened physiological arousal and 
cognitive distress in PTSD, two main cognitive-behavioral treatments have emerged from the 
PTSD treatment literature. Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) and Prolonged Exposure 
Therapy (PE) are the most widely studied and supported treatments for PTSD, and are primary 
psychological interventions utilized by the Veteran Affairs Health facilities for the treatment of 
combat veterans (Foa, Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009). Multiple randomized control trials 
(RCTs) and meta-analyses have provided evidence that CPT and PE have relatively equivalent 
beneficial outcomes (Foa et al., 2009; Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 1991; Resick & 
Schnicke, 1992) despite different theoretical mechanisms of change. The Emotion Processing 
Theory, underlying PE, posits that repeated exposure to the anxiety-provoking stimuli facilitates 
the naturally occurring process of habituation (Foa & Kozak, 1986). This process allows new 
learning to occur, resulting in traumatic memories no longer eliciting heightened physiological 
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responses and emotional distress (Foa, Hearst, Dancu, Hembree, & Jaycox, 1994). Utilizing a 
different approach, and based on social cognitive theory, CPT attempts to promote recovery 
through an examination of the meaning of the traumatic event (Resick & Schnicke, 1992). 
Repeated altering of maladaptive cognitions and the integration of the traumatic event into the 
patient’s “self-schema” is theorized to reduce the secondary emotions (e.g., depression, guilt, 
self-blame) and intrusive recollections associated with PTSD (Resick, Monson, & Chard, 2010). 
Although different mechanisms of change are suggested by these theories, empirical 
evidence suggests that these changes do not occur in isolation (Gallagher & Resick, 2012; Zalta 
et al., 2013). Meta-analytic (Benish, Imel, & Wampold, 2008; Resick et al., 2002) and individual 
research studies have shown that, through a yet unidentified mechanism, cognitive changes occur 
during PE (Zalta et al., 2013), and that some techniques used in CPT (e.g., writing of traumatic 
scenes) have been likened to exposure and habituation. This evidence supports the reduction of 
both cognitive and physiological symptoms of PTSD, regardless of treatment type (Gallagher & 
Resick, 2012; Resick et al., 2002). Recent empirical evidence suggests that although PE and CPT 
both provide beneficial changes in cognitions and physiological arousal, the different underlying 
mechanisms of change promote increased recovery in their respective domain (Gallagher & 
Resick, 2012). Specifically, Gallagher and Resick found that PE resulted in a decrease in PTSD 
symptoms as mediated by habituation, independent of cognitive changes in hopelessness, 
whereas CPT resulted in similar decreases in PTSD symptoms, as mediated by greater changes 
in hopelessness (Gallagher & Resick, 2012). However, in this study, PE was still shown to 
significantly reduce hopelessness, and more recent research has provided further evidence for 
adaptive changes in cognitions occurring during PE treatment (Zalta et al., 2013).  
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Although these results appear to suggest different changes that may be best utilized by 
combining treatments, several studies have explored combining PE with cognitive restructuring 
(Foa & Rauch, 2004; Moser, Cahill, & Foa, 2010). Unfortunately, these studies have shown that 
this approach did not enhance the efficacy of either treatment. One potential explanation for 
these findings may be that different PTSD patients respond to different treatment modalities. For 
example, several researchers have suggested that a possible explanation for a patient’s lack of 
improvement after PE may be an over-fixation on the meaning of the trauma that interferes with 
the habituation process (Tarrier et al., 1999). However, a precise method for separating 
individuals with PTSD into distinct categories has proven difficult. 
One study providing information relevant to treatment matching in PTSD retrospectively 
examined the effects of PE and Cognitive Restructuring (CR), with PTSD patients reporting 
higher levels of negative trauma-related cognitions (Moser, Cahil, & Foa, 2010). The results 
from this study suggest that individuals receiving the combined treatment fared worse than those 
patients receiving PE alone. However, several confounds could explain the results from this 
study. Although patients did not differ on initial assessments of PTSD symptom severity, it is 
possible that patients who report heightened physiological symptoms coupled with secondary 
cognitive symptoms associated with PTSD are experiencing a greater level of overall distress as 
compared to patients with primarily physiological symptoms. Additionally, in this particular 
study, the length of treatment sessions was identical in each condition despite the addition of 
therapy content. As a result, content from the PE condition (e.g., discussions of anxiety) was 
sacrificed in order to accommodate CR. Given the absence of dismantling studies in the 
literature, essential components of PE may have been removed in this study as research has 
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shown that affective labeling is associated with greater gains in exposure therapy (Kircanski, 
Leiberman, & Craske, 2012). Additionally, not providing adequate time for CR suggests that 
perhaps neither treatment was provided adequately. Despite these methodological limitations, the 
findings from numerous studies suggest that PE alone has a beneficial effect on cognitions (Foa 
& Rauch, 2004; Gallagher & Resick, 2012; Resick et al., 2013; Zalta et al., 2013), and that this 
effect may be a potential mechanism of beneficial therapeutic change (Zalta et al., 2013). 
However, the administration of CPT appears to achieve greater changes in these cognitions by 
directly addressing them (Gallagher & Resick, 2012; Resick et al., 2013), and combining these 
treatments may be contraindicated.  
Existing studies point to adjustments in maladaptive cognitions, and the facilitation of 
habituation as primary targets of intervention and essential components of achieving desired 
treatment outcome (Keane & Barlow, 2002; Resick, 2001). However, treatments targeting these 
two mechanisms do not work for all individuals with PTSD (Schnurr et al., 2007), and both CPT 
and PE report a significant dropout rate (≈20 percent) (Bryant et al., 2007). The existing 
literature indicates that individual characteristics associated with dropout include catastrophic 
cognitions and higher avoidance (Bryant et al., 2007). Thus, the perception that these symptoms 
are not being targeted or improved upon in treatment may lead an individual to withdraw early 
from the intervention.  
The empirical evidence summarized above suggests that distinct response patterns to 
PTSD therapy may be associated with different underlying mechanisms that may necessitate 
targeted treatment. The first step in disentangling the contribution of different trauma types or 
maladaptive response patterns is, therefore, to identify a reliable way to detect specific symptom 
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profiles that may respond differently to empirically supported interventions. In response, the 
current study conducted a CFA based on mechanisms of beneficial therapeutic change that may 
inform treatment matching. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHOD 
Participants 
Data was collected as part of a Department of Defense-funded RCT that is treating 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat 
veterans diagnosed with PTSD. Veterans participated in either a 3-week or 17-week treatment 
condition that began with a variety of pre-treatment symptom and diagnostic measures. 
Participants were paid $50 for completing the pre-treatment assessment. The sample consisted of 
both third-party mandated and treatment-seeking veterans. Inclusion criteria required a PTSD 
diagnosis confirmed by supervised clinicians. Twenty percent of diagnostic interviews were 
randomly selected for Inter-rater reliability analysis. This analysis revealed excellent consistency 
on rating CAPS total scores (ICC=.996 ₭=1.00) and PTSD diagnosis (k=1.00). To collect a 
representative sample, minimal exclusion criteria were used to derive the original sample. 
Participants were only excluded if they had a significant history of cardiac symptoms that could 
have potentially interfered with treatment, an acute substance abuse disorder that prevented the 
participant from demonstrating two weeks of abstinence, medications that could not be stabilized 
for two weeks, or the participant met criteria for antisocial personality disorder. Due to the nature 
of the OEF and OIF conflicts resulting in high rates of Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) (Shively & 
Perl, 2012; Vasterling, Verfaellie, & Sullivan, 2009), veterans diagnosed with a TBI were 
included in the original sample.   
The original sample included 150 OEF/OIF veterans, (139 males; 11 females) between 
the ages of 21 and 63 years (MAge= 35.32 SD=9.54). Among the sample, 26% were on active 
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duty, 42% reported a history of a TBI diagnosis, and 51.3% received service-connected disability 
at the time of pre-assessment. In regards to their service, 61.3% had served in the Army, 26.7% 
in the Marines, 6% in the Air Force, 5.3% in the Navy, and 0.7% as Civilian Contractors.  For 
52% of the veterans in the original sample, high school was their highest level of education, 
whereas, 12.7% completed some high school. 25.3% had completed some college, 4.7 % had 
received a bachelor’s degree, and 1.3% had a master’s degree. 4% of the sample did not report 
their highest level of education. Of the veterans, 55.2% identified as White, 13.4% as 
Black/African American, 24.7% as Hispanic, 2% as Asian, 2% as Biracial, and 2.7% identified 
as Other. In regards to their relationship status, 33.7% were Single, 43.3% were Married 8.7% 
were Separated, 13.6% were Divorced and 0.7% were in a Domestic Partnership. 
The original sample included 150 OEF/OIF veterans, (139 males; 11 females) between 
the ages of 21 and 63 years (MAge= 35.32 SD=9.54). Among the sample, 26% were on active 
duty, 42% reported a history of a TBI diagnosis, and 51.3% received service-connected disability 
at the time of pre-assessment. In regards to their service, 61.3% had served in the Army, 26.7% 
in the Marines, 6% in the Air Force, 5.3% in the Navy, and 0.7% as Civilian Contractors.  For 
52% of the veterans in the original sample, high school was their highest level of education, 
whereas, 12.7% completed some high school. 25.3% had completed some college, 4.7 % had 
received a bachelor’s degree, and 1.3% had a master’s degree. 4% of the sample did not report 
their highest level of education. Of the veterans, 55.2% identified as White, 13.4% as 
Black/African American, 24.7% as Hispanic, 2% as Asian, 2% as Biracial, and 2.7% identified 
as Other. In regards to their relationship status, 33.7% were Single, 43.3% were Married 8.7% 
were Separated, 13.6% were Divorced and 0.7% were in a Domestic Partnership. 
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Measures 
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) 
The CAPS (Blake et al., 1990; Weathers & Litz, 1994) is a 30-item semi-structured interview 
that assesses the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. Additionally, the CAPS includes dual (i.e., 
frequency and severity) ratings of the 17 PTSD symptoms and questions targeting the social and 
occupational impairment associated with PTSD. The CAPS interview allows clinicians to gain 
additional detail and insight into the patient’s trauma and subsequent impairment in functioning. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) 
The SCID-I (First et al, 1996) is a semi-structured clinical diagnostic interview that includes 
major DSM-IV-TR Axis I diagnostic classes. The SCID was administered to the original sample 
to assess for comorbid diagnoses such as depression, as well as to confirm the diagnosis of 
PTSD. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Disorders (SCID-II) 
The SCID-II Self-Report (First et al., 1997) is a 119-item measure for assessing the 11 Axis II 
personality disorders from the DSM-IV-R (4
th
 edition, revised). Specific questions were selected 
(see analytic strategy below) that best represented maladaptive cognitions associated with PTSD. 
The DSM-5 Negative Cognitions and Mood criteria and the CPT treatment manual were used to 
inform the selection of these items. Although the SCID-II is most often used to assess the 
occurrence of personality based psychopathology, this self-report measure contains a wealth of 
information related to a participant’s clinical presentation.  A limited number of items were 
drawn from each of the SCID-II categories, and, therefore, the amount of items selected was not 
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sufficient to qualify for a SCID-II personality diagnosis. Additionally, the SCID-II self-report 
was designed as a screening measuring and is not recommend for use in isolation to diagnose 
personality disorders (SCID-II User’s Guide; First et al., 1997) due to the conceptual overlap 
between distress-related Axis-I disorders and personality-based psychopathology. 
The Quality of Life Inventory (QOLI) 
The QOLI (Frisch et al., 1993) is a 32-item measure assessing the importance and satisfaction of 
16 life domains: Health, Self-Esteem, Goals and Values, Money, Work, Play, Learning, 
Creativity, Helping, Love, Friends, Children, Relatives, Home, Neighborhood, and Community. 
These 16 items are rated on a 3-point Likert scale for importance and a 6-point Likert scale for 
satisfaction. The item representing self-esteem was selected to assess the esteem component of 
CPT and the maladaptive self-blame cognition.  
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAM_D) 
The HAM_D (HAMD; Hamilton, 1959) is a 17-item measure assessing the symptoms of 
depression and is one of the most widely used scales to assess depressive symptomatology. 
Specific items were selected (see analytic strategy) to differentiate maladaptive cognitions 
related to the traumatic event and items related to comorbid depressive symptomatology.  
Overall Assessment Strategy 
 
  Analytic Strategy 
The original sample is thought to be highly representative of a veteran population. 
Researchers have recommended the inclusive sampling method implemented in this study to best 
generalize research findings to veteran populations (Frueh, Mirabella, & Turner, 1995).  The 
14 
 
sample size of 150 was supported based on best-practices for Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) suggesting the practicality of conducting a CFA with lower sample sizes when examining 
an established factor structure in a unique population (MacCallum, et al., 1999). The CFA was 
conducted using IBM SPSS AMOS 21(Arbuckle, 2006) to perform estimation techniques, fit 
indices, and comparative evaluations of competing models. Items from the CAPS assessing 
PTSD symptoms were supplemented with selected items from the SCID-II, QOLI, and HAMD.  
 Many of the existing factor-analytic models examining PTSD have been based on 
establishing the underlying structure of the disorder. Although these theoretical models are 
essential for establishing diagnostic criteria and uncovering new targets of intervention, the 
direct treatment utility of these models is limited. Therefore, the present analysis aimed to build 
on aspects of the established dysphoric and numbing models proposed by Simms and colleagues 
(2002) and King and colleagues (1998). Additionally, questionnaire items were incorporated to 
establish a cognitive subset of symptoms corresponding to the central tenets of CPT (see Table 
2) and consistent with DSM-5 negative cognition criteria for PTSD (see Table 3). 
The present CFA aimed to construct a model (see Figures 1 & 2) that was based on the 
mechanisms of action of PE and CPT interventions with the goal of treatment matching. The 
proposed model contained two hypothesized latent variables comprised of cognitive or 
physiological symptoms; both stemming from a larger PTSD construct. Although PE and CPT 
attribute the occurrence and maintenance of symptoms to different underlying causes (fear 
conditioning vs. maladaptive cognitions), some shared symptoms could theoretically result from 
either of these causes. Therefore, symptoms shared between the cognitive and hyperarousal 
constructs are represented in Figure 1 by three latent variables (e.g., re-experiencing symptoms, 
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anxious arousal, and effortful avoidance) that have been validated in Elhai and colleagues’ five-
factor model (2011). However, other CFA studies have proposed a two factor model that 
combines re-experiencing and hyperarousal symptoms (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 1998). 
Therefore, two separate models were examined to test the validity of the shared symptom 
hypothesis. The shared symptom model hypothesizes shared symptom clusters (anxious arousal 
& re-experiencing symptoms); the specified symptom model identifies these symptoms as part of 
the physiological symptom construct.   
Previous factor-analytic studies have also validated the distinct factor loadings for 
effortful avoidance symptoms demonstrating that criterion C1 (efforts to avoid thoughts, 
feelings…associated with the trauma) and C2 (efforts to avoid activities….that arouse 
recollections of the trauma) load separately from other, more cognition-based avoidance 
strategies. These cognition-based avoidance strategies (C4-C7) are referred to in other models as 
emotional numbing, and are therefore clustered under the latent variable of “emotional numbing” 
with the omission of C3 (inability to recall important aspects of the trauma). Criterion C3 was 
included as an “anxious arousal” shared variable because it has previously demonstrated poor fit 
with the emotional numbing construct (King, Leskin, King, & Weathers, 1998), and could 
theoretically result from either sustained hyperarousal or rumination on trauma related 
cognitions. Previous studies have also demonstrated evidence for memory impairments 
associated with pathological anxiety (Boldrini et al., 2005). Therefore, in the specified symptom 
model, C3 falls under the physiological symptom cluster.   
In addition to emotional numbing, the cognitive symptom construct was based on the 
theoretical mechanisms of action for CPT as well as the DSM-5 criteria for negative alterations 
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in cognitions and mood. This construct was comprised of several SCID-II items in addition to 
items derived from other measures including the QOLI and HAM_D, which correspond to 
symptoms targeted by CPT (e.g., negative beliefs, distorted blame of self and others, guilt). In 
CPT treatment, these cognitions are addressed through specific modules targeting concerns over 
guilt, self-blame, safety, trust, control, and esteem. 
The physiological symptom construct (see Table 4) has also been partially supported in 
previous studies examining the dysphoria model which have demonstrated that symptom D4 
(hypervigilance) and D5 (exaggerated startle response) load onto a separate hyperarousal 
construct. Additionally, these models have also shown that D1 (difficulty falling asleep), D2 
(irritability and outburst of anger), and D3 (difficulty concentrating) also load independently 
from the main hyperarousal variables. Therefore, theory justified the separation of these 
constructs. In addition to the established hyperarousal construct, criterion B5 (physiological 
reactivity to exposure cues) was included in the physiological arousal factor as exposure therapy 
is theorized to best target this type of conditioned fear response. This symptom is traditionally 
subsumed under intrusion/re-experiencing symptom category; however, for the purposes of this 
model, it was included as a physiological symptom.  
 Some researchers have suggested that the cognitive symptoms observed in patients with 
PTSD are more attributable to comorbid depression (Brewin et al., 2009), whereas others have 
suggested that these cognitive symptoms are unique to PTSD (Friedman et al., 2011). Therefore, 
the proposed model also included a latent depression variable that was comprised of four 
manifest variables that are more consistent with a depression diagnosis, but are not part of the 
DSM-5 criteria for PTSD (e.g., depressed mood, loss of appetite, loss of weight, and 
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psychomotor retardation). The first of these variables was the SCID-I diagnosis of Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD), and the others were symptom-derived from the HAM_D 
depression items.  
The first phase of the analysis evaluated the fit of the shared symptom model as 
compared to the specified symptom treatment matching model to determine the best model for 
continued model evaluation. The next phase of the proposed analysis evaluated the validity of 
the treatment matching model by comparing it to three additional models. As a primary point of 
comparison, the proposed model was first compared to a simplistic model containing all 17 
PSTD symptoms with the addition of the cognitive items and no latent variables. The treatment 
matching model was then compared to the DSM-IV and DSM-5 models. Other researchers have 
employed this method to demonstrate the validity of their model (Simms et al., 2002). In the 
second phase of analysis, the proposed model was then compared to four models including 
depression with the goal of establishing the role of depression in the occurrence of cognitive 
symptoms. The second phase of analysis initially evaluated if the correlation hypothesis depicted 
in Figure 5 and 6 between depression and PTSD was accurate. The series of models (Figures 5 to 
8) also evaluated the independent nature of the cognitive symptom construct to determine if the 
variance in this construct was more attributable to PTSD or comorbid depression. 
Data Preparation 
The analysis was estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as this method has 
been shown to be robust to smaller sample sizes and non-normal data (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
However, after a simplification of the hypothesized treatment matching model, maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation was also appropriate and reported. Consistent with SEM best 
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practices (Hu & Bentler., 1999), model fit was assessed using several fit indices. Model fit was 
assessed primarily using the comparative fit index (CFI) and standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR), as both have been shown to be robust to smaller sample sizes (Bentler, 1988).  
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was also examined to assist with 
interpretation. Cases with more than 10% missing data were excluded resulting in 3 participants 
be excluded from the analysis. The remainder of the missing data was estimated using the series 
mean for CAPS, HAM_D and the QOLI and the mean of nearby points for the SCID-II. The 
SCID-II nearby points estimation technique was implemented because the grouped dichotomous 
item structure of the measures where in questions are grouped to reflect related constructs.    
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
Latent variables representing symptom categories (e.g., re-experiencing, effortful 
avoidance, emotional numbing) were removed to reduce the complexity of the proposed model. 
The removal of these latent variables allowed for a more direct examination of the validity of 
physiological and cognitive symptom constructs. A comparison of two proposed models revealed 
that fit was similar whether hypothesized shared symptoms were specified uniquely (CFI=.815; 
RMSEA=.057; SRMR=.08; Figure 4) or simultaneously (CFI=.816; RMSEA= .057; SRMR=.08; 
Figure 3) to the cognitive and physiological symptom constructs. Only effortful avoidance 
symptoms (C6 and C7) were shared between constructs in the unique specification model, 
whereas emotional numbing symptoms and re-experiencing symptoms were modeled as 
indicators of the cognitive construct and physiological construct, respectively. However, since 
more specified paths always lead to better model fit, parsimony fit indices were examined to 
account for the number of paths drawn. Parsimony fit indices revealed that the unique 
specification model (PCFI=.742) demonstrated better fit than the shared symptoms model 
(PCFI=.707). As a result, the unique specification model was used for the remainder of model 
testing.  
The hypothesized treatment matching model was then compared to three well-established 
models: a simplistic model containing all 17 PSTD symptoms with the addition of the cognitive 
items, the DSM-IV 3-factor model and the DSM-5 4-factor model. The chi square for the 
hypothesized treatment matching model was significant (χ2(311)=460.374, p<.001), which 
typically indicates poor fit. However, chi square is an absolute fit index that may be overly 
sensitive to small differences between the observed and predicted covariance matrices 
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(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Therefore, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) and 
the root mean square error of approximation RMSEA were also examined.  They indicated 
marginal (SRMR=.08) and good fit (RMSEA=.057), respectively. Due to the small sample size, 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation method was also implemented and revealed a 
goodness of fit index (GFI) that suggested marginal fit (GFI=.829), whereas RMSEA and SRMR 
suggested good fit (RMSEA=.027) and poor fit (.10), respectively. The inconsistency between 
these fit indices usually reflects a model requiring additional specification or revision. Overall, 
across several estimation techniques and fit indices, the hypothesized treatment matching model 
demonstrated marginal fit; however, two measure items did not significantly contribute to the 
model. Specifically, the cognitive items judging others harshly (SCID-II_37), believing that most 
people are no good (SCID-II _38) and not being able to forgive people for past grievances (SCID 
-II_46) did not account for a significant portion of the variance. However, these items did 
account for variance in the DSM-5 Model. Compared to alternative models, however, the 
treatment matching model demonstrated better fit than the simplistic PTSD model the DSM-IV 
model, and the DSM-5 model (See Tables 6 & 7).  
 Models were also examined to uncover the relationship between PTSD, 
depressive symptomatology, and cognitive symptoms. This analysis revealed that models 
containing a depressive construct demonstrated equally marginal fit (See Tables 8 & 9) 
regardless of correlation or causal hypotheses. Therefore, a statistical comparison of these 
models was not conducted. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION 
Researchers have begun to acknowledge a diverse range of post-trauma symptoms and 
the subsequent impairment associated with multiple types of traumatic events. In particular, 
combat soldiers experience multiple types of potentially traumatic events such as direct combat, 
hostage situations, and violations of personal moral standards (i.e., moral injury). Recent 
evidence suggests that different types of traumatic events may elicit different symptoms profiles 
(Stein et al., 2009). Moreover, two theoretically distinct treatments, PE and CPT, have emerged 
from the literature as two efficacious methods for treating these symptoms in veterans (Foa, 
Keane, Friedman, & Cohen, 2009) and appear to have relatively equivalent outcomes.  Our 
investigation attempted to validate a treatment matching model that contained factors directly 
related to the central mechanisms of action within PE and CPT. The physiological symptom 
factor in the proposed model included symptoms (e.g., hyperarousal, flashbacks, physiological 
reactivity to exposure cues) theorized to be most amenable to Emotion Processing Theory and 
habituation-based treatments such as PE. The cognitive symptom factor included items 
representing the DSM-5 PTSD maladaptive cognition criteria (e.g., guilt & negative 
expectations) and aligned with social cognition theory as well as therapeutic mechanisms 
essential to CPT.  
 The resulting treatment matching model demonstrated marginal fit; however, multiple fit 
indices revealed that our model fit the data better than several established models including the 
DSM-IV and DSM-5 models. Furthermore, specific symptom loadings varied in magnitude (See 
Tables 10 & 11) whereas physiological (β=.654) and psychological (β=.650) reactivity and 
difficulty concentrating (β=.597) demonstrated the best fit with the physiological construct (in 
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treatment matching model). The highest loadings for the cognitive construct were items 
reflecting a sense of foreshortened future (β=.555), self-esteem (β= -.560) and anhedonia 
(β=.613).  
   Although this study provides some initial support for the treatment matching model and 
can be utilized to refine further model testing, there are several limitations worth noting. The first 
of these limitations is associated with the items that defined the cognitive symptom construct. In 
a recent revision to the DSM criteria for PTSD, several cognitive symptoms were added that 
more broadly defines the disorder to include multiple cognitive distortions in addition to 
heightened physiological reactivity. Given this recent revision, several cognitive symptoms were 
not measured during the ongoing PTSD randomized clinical trial from which data for this 
investigation were drawn. As a result, items from other measures (HAM_D, SCID-II) were 
extracted instead to best represent these constructs. Although these items did appear to match the 
DSM-5 criteria, the items were not specifically related to PTSD nor previously established as 
valid measures of trauma-related cognitions. Additionally, several of these items were 
dichotomous and may have limited the variance captured by the model.  
The conclusions of this study may also be limited by the treatment modalities offered to 
our sample. Data from two treatment conditions (3-week & 17-week) were collapsed to obtain 
sufficient power for model testing. Examining the samples separately revealed significant 
differences in overall PTSD severity as well as multiple individual symptoms representing the 
cognitive construct. It is possible that individuals with greater PTSD severity present with a 
unique symptom profile not represented by our model. Additionally, the data used for model 
testing was gathered from a sample of treatment seeking veterans. It is possible that veterans 
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electing to participate in this trial self-selected based on specific symptoms and the perceived 
benefits explained to them by study recruiters. Furthermore, individuals with a cognitive based 
symptom profile may be less likely to seek out treatment trials due to symptoms such as 
anhedonia and detachment from others.  
The results of this study also raise interesting questions regarding the co-occurrence of 
depression and PTSD. Few conclusions can be drawn due to the marginal fit demonstrated by 
these models (Figures 5 through 8). With this in mind, some information can be drawn from 
these models to inform future model testing. For example, the models examining a causal 
relationship between the depression construct and the cognitive construct demonstrated worse fit 
relative to models containing an uninfluenced cognitive construct. Furthermore, the addition of 
the depression factor did not significantly reduce the overall model fit, suggesting that comorbid 
depressive symptomatology is an important consideration for future model testing. However, 
these differences were small and interpreting association within marginal fitting models should 
be done with caution. Overall, the overlap of the cognitive criteria within PTSD and depression 
remains an open question that requires further investigation.  
 This is the first study to attempt to devise a model based on therapeutic mechanisms of 
action. Based on our findings, future research should continue to refine and develop models for 
the purpose of treatment matching. PTSD is an ideal candidate for this technique due to the 
development of two theoretically distinct efficacious treatments and need for improved treatment 
outcomes. Further research should also continue to uncover the mechanisms of action underlying 
these treatments and better incorporate this information to refine and more effectively deliver 
existing treatments.    
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
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Manifest Variables: 
SCID2_34 Do you believe that you are basically an inadequate person and often don't feel good about yourself?  
SCID2_35 Do you often put yourself down? 
SCID2_36 Do you keep thinking about bad things that have happened in the past or worry about bad things that might happen in the future?  
SCID2_37 Do you often judge others harshly and easily find fault with them?  
SCID2_38 Do you think that most people are basically no good?  
SCID2_39 Do you almost always expect things to turn out badly?  
SCID2_40 Do you often feel guilty about things you have or haven't done? 
SCID2_46 Are there many people you can’t forgive because they did or said something to you a long time ago? 
QOLI_4 How satisfied are you with your self-esteem?  
HAMD_2 Feelings of Guilt: Do you often brood about past mistakes?  
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CAPS_1 Intrusive Recollections 
CAPS_2 Distressing Dreams 
CAPS_3 Acting or feeling as if the event were recurring 
CAPS_4 Psychological distress at exposure cues 
CAPS_5 Physiological reactivity on exposure to cues 
CAPS_6 Avoidance of thoughts or feelings 
CAPS_7 Avoidance of activities, places, or people 
CAPS_8 Inability to recall important aspects of the trauma 
CAPS_9 Diminished interest in activities  
CAPS_ 10 Detachment & Estrangement  
CAPS_11 Restricted range of affect  
CAPS_12 Sense of Foreshortened Future 
CAPS_13 Difficulty falling or staying asleep 
CAPS_14 Irritability or outbursts of anger 
CAPS_15 Difficulty Concentrating 
CAPS_16 Hypervigilance 
CAPS_17 Exaggerated Startle Response 
                               Figure 1. Hypothesized shared symptom  treatment-matching model with manifest variables 
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     Figure 2. Hypothesized specified symptom  treatment-matching model  
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            Figure 3. Shared Symptom Model 
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          Figure 4. Specifified Symptom Model 
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Manifest Variables (Depression): 
SCID_I MDD diagnosis from SCID I 
HAMD_1 Depressed Mood: Sadness, hopeless, helpless, worthless 
HAMD_8 Retardation: Slowness of thought and Speech: impaired ability to concentrate: decreased motor activity 
HAMD_12 Somatic Symptoms Gastro-intestinal (Loss of Appetite) 
HAMD_16 Loss of Weight 
Figure 5. PTSD Correlated with Depression Model with Manifest Variables 
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Figure 6. PTSD Predicting Depression Model 
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                  Figure 7.PTSD Correlated with Depression Predicting Cognitive Symptoms Model 
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               Figure 8.  PTSD Predicting Depression Predicting Cognitive Symptoms Model 
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Table 1. Changes to DSM Criteria for PTSD 
DSM-5 Criteria for PTSD DSM-IV Criteria for PTSD 
B1. Intrusive thoughts 
B2. Nightmares 
B3. Re-living trauma 
B4. Emotional cue reactivity 
B5. Physiological cue reactivity 
B1. Intrusive thoughts 
B2. Nightmares 
B3. Re-living trauma 
B4. Emotional cue reactivity 
B5. Physiological cue reactivity 
C1. Avoidance of thoughts 
C2.Avoidance of reminders 
C1. Avoidance of thoughts  
C2. Avoidance of reminders 
C3. Trauma related amnesia 
C4. Loss of interest 
C5. Feeling detached 
C6. Constricted affect 
C7. Hopelessness 
D1. Trauma related amnesia 
D2. Persistent negative beliefs about the world 
D3. Persistent distorted blame 
D4. Persistent trauma-related emotions 
D5. Loss of interest 
D6. Feeling detached 
D7. Constricted affect 
D1. Difficulty sleeping 
D2. Irritability/anger 
D3. Difficulty concentrating 
D4. Overly alert 
D5. Easily startled 
E1. Irritable or aggressive behavior 
E2. Self-destructive or reckless behavior 
E3. Hypervigilance 
E4. Exaggerated startle response 
E5. Problems in concentration 
E6. Sleep disturbance 
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Table 2.  Measure items that reflect CPT Treatment Themes 
Central Themes in CPT Items from Measures 
 
 
Self-blame/guilt 
Do you often feel guilty about things you have or haven't done? 
(scid2_40) 
 
Feelings of Guilt: Do you often brood about past mistakes?(HAMD_ 2) 
 
 
Safety 
Sense of foreshortened future  ( CAPS_C12)  
 
Do you keep thinking about bad things that have happened in the past 
or worry about bad things that might happen in the future? (scid2_36) 
 
Trust 
 
 
Do you find it hard to be open, even with people you are close to? 
(scid2_3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
 
 
 
 
Detachment & Estrangement (CAPS_C10) 
 
Do you keep thinking about bad things that have happened in the past 
or worry about bad things that might happen in the future? (scid2_36) 
 
Do you almost always expect things to turn out badly? (scid2_39) 
 
Is it hard for you to do simple or routine things for yourself? 
(HAMD_23) 
 
 
 
 
Esteem 
How satisfied are you with your self-esteem? (QOLI_4) 
How do the problems you have affect your self-esteem; how do you 
feel about yourself? (HAMD_24) 
Do you believe that you’re not as good, as smart, or as attractive as 
most people (scid2_6)) 
Do you believe that you are basically an inadequate person and often 
don't feel good about yourself? (scid2_34) 
 
Intimacy Detachment & Estrangement (CAPS_C10) 
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Table 3. Basis for Cognitive Variable Items Selection. 
DSM-5: Criterion D: 
Negative alterations in cognitions and 
mood that began or worsened after the 
traumatic event.  
 
Items from Measures 
 
 
 
1. Inability to recall key features of 
the traumatic event (usually 
dissociative amnesia; not due to 
head injury, alcohol, or drugs). 
 
 
 
Inability to recall important aspects of trauma (CAPS_8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Persistent (and often distorted) 
negative beliefs and expectations 
about oneself or the world (e.g., "I 
am bad," "The world is 
completely dangerous"). 
Do you believe that you are basically an inadequate 
person and often don't feel good about yourself? 
(scid2_34) 
Do you often put yourself down? (scid2_35) 
Do you keep thinking about bad things that have 
happened in the past or worry about bad things that 
might happen in the future? (scid2_36) 
Do you often judge others harshly and easily find fault 
with them? (scid2_37) 
Do you think that most people are basically no good? 
(scid2_38) 
Do you almost always expect things to turn out badly? 
(scid2_39) 
 
3. Persistent distorted blame of self or 
others for causing the traumatic 
event or for resulting consequences. 
Are there many people you can’t forgive because they 
did or said something to you a long time ago? (scid2_46) 
How satisfied are you with your self-esteem? (QOLI_4) 
 
4. Persistent negative trauma-related 
emotions (e.g., fear, horror, anger, 
guilt, or shame). 
 
Do you often feel guilty about things you have or haven't 
done? (scid2_40) 
Feelings of Guilt: Do you often brood about past 
mistakes? (HAMD_2) 
5. Markedly diminished interest in 
(pre-traumatic) significant 
activities. 
Diminished interest in activities (CAPS_ 9) 
6. Feeling alienated from others (e.g., 
detachment or estrangement). 
Detachment & Estrangement (CAPS_ 10) 
7. Constricted affect: persistent 
inability to experience positive 
emotions. 
Restricted range of affect (CAPS_11) 
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Table 4.  Items Selected for Arousal Variables 
Physiological Reactivity Hyperarousal 
Phys. Reactivity on exposure cues (CAPS_B5) Hypervigilance (CAPS_D4) 
 Exaggerated startle response (CAPS_D5) 
 Problems in concentration (CAPS_D3) 
 
Table 5.. Items Selected for Depression Variables 
Depression Diagnosis Additional Depressive S(x) 
Major Depression Diagnosis, Current (SCID-I) Depressed Mood (HAMD_1) 
 Loss of Appetite (HAMD_12) 
 Loss of Weight (HAMD_16) 
 Psychomotor Retardation (HAMD_8) 
 
Table 6. ML Fit Indices for Model Comparison of Treatment Matching Model 
Model χ2 χ2 sig df RMSEA CFI AIC BCC SRMR 
Hypothesized 460.374 <.001 311 .057 .815 648.374 691.878 .08 
Simplistic 627.029 <.001 324 .079 .625 789.029 826.516 .09 
DSM-IV 267.983 <.001 117 .093  .736 373.983 388.548 .10 
DSM-5 628.203 <.001 267 .095  .520 794.203 829.292 .14 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BCC= Browne-Cudeck Criterion; 
SRMR= Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
 
Table 7. GLS  Fit Indices for Model Comparison of Treatment Matching Model 
Model χ2 χ2 sig df RMSEA GFI AIC BCC SRMR 
Hypothesized 354.154 <.001 311 .031 .824 488.154 519.162 .11 
Simplistic 421.066 <.001 324 .045 .791 529.066 554.058 .13 
DSM-IV 204.894 <.001 119 .070  .828 823.044 881.574 .22 
DSM-5 322.170 <.02 267 .037  .827 438.170 462.691 .18 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BCC= Browne-Cudeck Criterion; 
SRMR= Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
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Table 8. ML Fit Indices for Models Examining PTSD and Depression 
Model χ2 χ2 sig df RMSEA CFI AIC BCC SRMR 
Correlated  Dep. 584.604 <.001 419 .052 .823 800.681 859.681 .08 
Corr. Dep/Predict.Cog.  609.044 <.001 420 .055  .798 823.044 881.574 .09 
Predict. Dep. 585.573 <.001 420 .051 .823 799.573 858.103 .08 
Predict Dep./Predict. Cog. 609.269 <.001 421 .055  .799 821.269 879.252 .09 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation; CFI = Comparative 
Fit Index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BCC= Browne-Cudeck Criterion; SRMR= 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
 
Table 9. GLS Fit Indices for Models Examining PTSD and Depression 
Model χ2 χ2 sig df RMSEA GFI AIC BCC SRMR 
Correlated  Dep. 452.359 .126 419 .023 .804 606.359 648.479 .11 
Corr. Dep/Predict.Cog.  454.710 .117 420 .055  .798 606.710 648.283 .15 
Predict. Dep. 452.657 .131 420 .023 .803 604.657 646.229 .14 
Predict Dep./Predict. Cog. 456.477 .113 421 .024  .802 606.477 647.503 .16 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = Root Mean Square of Approximation; CFI = Comparative 
Fit Index; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BCC=Browne-Cudeck Criterion; SRMR= 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
 
Table 10. Treatment Matching Model: Physiological Symptom Loadings 
 β Pvalue 
Re-Experiencing Symptoms   
Intrusive Recollections (CAPS_1) .597 <.001 
Distressing Dreams (CAPS_2) .400 <.001 
Acting/Feeling Recurring (CAPS_3) .488 <.001 
Psychological Reactivity (CAPS_4) .650 <.001 
Anxious Arousal Symptoms   
Inability to Recall (CAPS_8) .597 .035 
Difficulty Sleeping(CAPS_13) .301 .003 
Irritability/Anger (CAPS_14) .450 <.001 
Difficulty Concentrating (CAPS_15) .582 <.001 
Hyper-Arousal Symptoms   
Physiological Reactivity (CAPS_5) .654 <.001 
Hypervigilance (CAPS_16) .434 <.001 
Exaggerated Startle Response(CAPS_17) .454 - 
Avoidance Physiological Symptoms   
Avoidance Thoughts (CAPS_6) .416 ..077 
Avoidance Places/Activities (CAPS_7) .190 .173 
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Table 11.  Treatment Matching Model: Cognitive Symptom Loadings 
 β Pvalue 
Negative Belief Symptoms   
Anhedonia (CAPS_9) .613 .002 
Detachment (CAPS_10) .511 .001 
Restricted Affect (CAPS_11) .312 .010 
Sense of Foreshortened Future(CAPS_12) .555 <.001 
Inadequate Person (SCID II_34) .445 .002 
Often Put Self Down (SCID II_35) .266 .020 
Preocc. with Past/Future Neg Events (SCID II_36) .306 .011 
Judge Others Harshly (SCID II_37) .108 .260 
Most people No Good (SCID II_38) .141 .154 
Expec. Neg. Outcomes (SCID II_39) .315 .009 
Distorted Blame Symptoms   
Can’t  Forgive Others (SCID II_46) .133 .174 
Satisfaction with Self-Esteem (QOLI4_4) -.560 <.001 
Guilt Symptoms   
Often Feeling Guilty (SCID II_40) .314 .010 
Guilt for Past Mistakes (HAMD_2) .339 - 
Avoidance: Cognitive Symptoms   
Avoidance Thoughts (CAPS_6) .149 .308 
Avoidance Places/Activities (CAPS_7) .418 .091 
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